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established a roadblock to combat the problem of vehicle operators endangering the lives of
others when drinking and driving.
Roadblocks had become common procedure during the years of 1986 and 1987. The
Utah County Sheriffs Office had been conducting roadblocks since late in the year of 1984
because of statistics proving the decrease in DUI arrests relative to the use of roadblocks.
In 1983 The County Sheriffs department issued 264 alcohol related citations and had 193
DUI arrests. There were 828 alcohol citations in 1984, and the DUI arrests rose to 293.
Fewer roadblocks were used in 1985 because of severe weather conditions, and alcohol
citations increased to 987 while DUI arrests dropped to 241. Alcohol related citations more
than doubled to 2397 in 1986, and DUI arrests increased to 432. There had been 2396
alcohol related citations as of October of 1987 with 467 DUI arrests. These statistics
indicate the effectiveness of roadblocks detecting alcohol violators-far more than the
standard roving patrol procedure. (R. 102).
On August 1, 1987 the County Sheriffs office set up a roadblock located at the
intersection of State Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi, Utah.
The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph of the Utah County Sheriffs Office.
The purpose of this roadblock was to check for driver's licenses, registrations, and alcohol
violations. (R. 80). Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square were place on
large highway cones in the middle of the roadway. Signs read "Sheriffs Roadblock
Ahead" and were placed with burning emergency flares. Emergency lights on patrol
vehicles were left in operation. (R. 79).
In effect at that time was a written policy by the Utah County Sheriff specifying the
guidelines to be followed for the operation of roadblocks. The purpose of the policy was
to "protect the constitutional rights of those stopped at the checkpoint." (See Exhibit "A",
the Sheriffs Department's Policy and Procedure for Checkpoints). Among the precautions
enumerated in the Sheriffs procedure were the vesting of authority to establish roadblocks
(in only the Sheriff, Bureau Commander, or Patrol Commander; field deputies could not
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On February 28, 1989, a jury in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork
Department, Utah County, State of Utah found defendant/appellant guilty of DUL (R.
229). The finding was entered in the court. (R. 285). Notice of Appeal was filed on
March 13, 1989. (R. 73).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States Supreme Court has held that when properly administered and when
the police officer's discretion is appropriately limited, roadblocks do not violate Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, the Court
suggested the use of "roadblock-type checks" for questioning all oncoming traffic. Of
primary concern to the Court was the balance between the overwhelming public concern of
drunken driver hazards and the potential for abusive discretion by officers and unwarranted
intrusion upon the individual which inappropriate roadblocks might produce. An oft-cited
Kansas Supreme Court decision carefully considered the issue of intrusion. It established
thirteen factors to be considered when determining whether the balancing test in a particular
case should be weighed in favor of the State. In this case, all but one factor was followed;
however, all need not be complied with in order to balance favorably to the State.
The roadblock in question was established pursuant to specific guidelines delineated
in a policy from the Utah County Sheriffs office and was followed accordingly. The
arresting officer approached defendant/appellant and, upon his detection of the smell of
alcohol and his observation of the defendant/appellant's performance in field sobriety tests,
made a constitutionally permissible arrest.
The lower court properly refused removal of three prospective jurors, given their
unquestioned ability to render a fair and impartial judgment. One juror was challenged
merely because of his moral disposition, yet such individual beliefs are no grounds for
removal. Furthermore, a potential juror cannot be removed merely because that person
enjoyed a very casual acquaintance with the prosecuting attorney over ten years before the
4

commencement of this trial. Only in instances of "close relationships" between a juror and
either counsel, witnesses or affected parties may that individual be removed for cause.
Finally, no grounds for removal for cause exist simply because one juror is familiar or
associated with another juror.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DUI ROADBLOCKS.
A. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that roadblocks do not violate the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when properly administered
and when the amount of the officers discretion is accordingly limited.
There is no doubt that stopping an automobile and detaining its driver constitute a

"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). The issue in this case is whether, given
appropriate guidelines for officers to follow and an appropriate amount of officer
discretion, a particular roadblock meets the requirements for a lawful search and seizure or
is "unreasonable" and therefore unconstitutional. Of primary concern in determining the
constitutionality of DUI roadblocks is the balance between the individual's protection from
unbridled governmental intrusion and the public's concern for safety upon our highways.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of roadblock "checkpoints" in
the case of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 540 (1976). There, the Border
Patrol had established a checkpoint on a major highway located in San Clemente and away
from the international border to check for illegal aliens crossing into the United States from
Mexico. The Court held that a vehicle may be stopped at a checkpoint for brief questioning
of its occupants, even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains
illegal aliens, and that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The Court
also held that the operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a
judicial warrant. 428 U.S. at 545.
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The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of roadblocks in the Prouse case, supra.
There a patrolman had randomly stopped a singled-out automobile to check the driver's
license and the vehicle's registration, yet had noticed neither suspicious activity nor any
traffic or equipment violations. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer detected the smell of
marijuana and observed some on the car floor. The Court held that absent an "articulable
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of the law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver's license and the vehicle's registration are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."
One critical distinction must be made between the Prouse case and the facts in the case
at bar: the Prouse case denounced arbitrary, single-car stops, while the instant case
involves multiple car stops. The issue in this case involves a roadblock established to apply
to all vehicles passing through a designated area, unlike the arbitrary selection of only one
individual automobile as in Prouse.
While the Prouse case is not exactly on point, its analysis would still extend to
roadblocks of any nature. The critical element in determining whether a roadblock spotcheck passes constitutional scrutiny, under the Prouse ruling, is the officer or patrolman's
amount of discretion. The Court stated:
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order 'to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions. . . . ' [Citations omitted.] 440 U.S. at 653.
Though the Court in Prouse ruled as unconstitutional the search and seizure in that
particular case, it did not, however, rule roadblocks unconstitutional per se. Instead, the
Court ruled that it is constitutionally permissible for states to develop "spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." One
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alternative the Court suggested was the "questioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblocktype stops

" 440 U.S. at 663.

The roadblock in question satisfies all bounds of "reasonableness" and in no way
invites unbridled or abusive discretion by its enforcing officials. All attending officers are
required to follow the specific procedure policies established by the County Sheriffs
office. (See Exhibit "A"). The factors enumerated in that policy-including proper
roadblock authorizations, safety considerations, detention periods and escape routes—
carefully mind the very fundamental constitutional freedoms of citizens who will encounter
such roadblocks.
B. The sobriety roadblock in this case complied with appropriate guidelines and
standards and therefore was not unconstitutional under the balancing of interests
test.
Defendant/appellant relies upon various decisions in other state courts which have
ruled that roadblocks violate fourth amendment rights. Neither the decisions of those state
courts nor the decision in a Utah District court cited by defendant/appellant is binding in
this case. This court, however, has recently addressed the use of sobriety roadblocks in
the case of State v. Stokes, Fourth Circuit Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
Case No. 87CR400, (See Exhibit "B") and should recognize that decision as controlling.
Central to the court's decision was its weighing of the public's enormous concern
regarding the threat of drunk drivers and the Fourth Amendment protections from abusive
police searches.
In Stokes, the defendant filed a Motion to Exclude, arguing that all evidence obtained
by the roadblock stop resulted from an unconstitutional seizure which violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah. The court denied the defendant's Motion to Exclude and the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Davis found as follows:
"[R]oadblocks must be approached on a case-by-case basis. Although a
small number of courts have held sobriety roadblocks to be per se
7

unconstitutional, this Court does not find their reasoning persuasive. A
majority of the courts finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have
suggested or intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been
cured." At p. 14.
Pertinent to the Court's decision was the consideration of both explicit and implicit
state statutory authority to conduct roadblocks. Though the Court in the Stokes case noted
the absence of explicit statutory authority in the Utah Code authorizing DUI roadblocks, it
did find implicit authority to conduct "roadblock activity." At p. 3. The following
excerpts from the Utah Code were of the essence:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. The authority of
municipal police officers to effect an arrest is likewise statutorily limited.
U.CA. § 77-7-15 (1953), as amended.
The members of the police force shall have the power and authority,
without process, to arrest and take into custody any person who shall
commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the officer, or
within his view, any breach of the peace, or any offense directly prohibited
by the laws of this state or by its ordinance. U.CA. § 10-3-915 (1953),
as amended.
The court further held that sobriety roadblocks are not subject to the "probable cause"
requirement.
While some tenuous arguments might be made by analogy, this court finds
that roadblocks do not fit the criteria and formulae establishing these
particular probable cause exceptions. It is the opinion of this Court, rather,
that roadblocks must be viewed under a balancing of interests analysis. In
automobile search cases over the last few decades the Supreme Court has
adopted the interest balancing approach, which is much less rigorous than
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, (citing Delaware v. Prouse, supra:
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. supra: and United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975))."
The court in Stokes held that the balancing of interests analysis, in effect, consists of
determining whether sobriety roadblocks "effectively advance a significant public concern,
and that the intrusiveness is reasonable." At p. 8.
The first step of this balancing of interests analysis, the advancement of a significant
public concern, requires prime consideration. Courts cannot ignore the overwhelming
public interest of drunk drivers threatening the lives of innocent citizens. Consider, for
8

example, the following alarming statistics included in the Stokes court's decision: over
25,000 persons are killed every year in alcohol-related traffic accidents; well over a half
million more are injured. Property damage in alcohol-related accidents exceeds five billion
dollars annually. As the court cites Justice Blackmun writing in Perez v. Campbell, the
"slaughter on the highways exceeds the death toll of all our wars." 402 U.S. 637, 672
(1971). The Stokes court continues:
Nor has the issue escaped public outcry and protest. Numerous groups
with catchy, aggressive acronyms have sprung into being in the past
decade. Moreover, membership is growing at a rate generally unparalleled
in civic interest groups, [citing, among others, MADD and RID nationally
andREDDIinUtah]. Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law
enforcement administrators may well be a driving reason for increased use
of roadblocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some degree in
combating drunk drivers, [citation omitted]. Furthermore, supplemental
incentive funds are available to those states which implement procedures
recommended by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
which include the use of sobriety roadblocks. [Citation omitted]." At. p.
9.
This court should likewise recognize the compelling gravity of the public's justified
concern regarding drunk drivers and the crucial role of roadblocks to detect those violators.
The next step in the competing interests balance considers the individual's right to be
free from intrusive searches. Again, in Stokes, the court cited authorities proving the very
minimal intrusion upon the individual as a result of roadblocks: "Most roadblocks require
only a few minutes of the motorist's time. [Citations omitted.] Usually the officer speaks
momentarily to the driver and views the interior of the vehicle, checking for alcohol
containers and weapon." [Citation omitted]. At p. 11.
The sobriety roadblock in this case, one established pursuant to applicable authority
and abiding by all applicable guidelines, hardly follows defendant/appellant's conjured
image of arbitrary and abusive discretion demonstrated by the enforcing officers. The
average length of time each motorist at this roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record
with the Utah County Sheriffs Office. It is estimated, however, that the average length of
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time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah County Sheriffs Office is
between 30 seconds and one minute, unless a violation is detected. (R. 80).
The Kansas Supreme Court carefully considered the intrusion aspect of DUI
roadblocks in State v. Deskins. 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1983). There the
court held that a DUI roadblock at which the defendant had been arrested did not violate the
Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court
established thirteen factors to be used when considering the intrusiveness of roadblocks
when they are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Those factors, used when determining
whether a DUI roadblock meets the balancing test in favor of the state, are as follows:
1. The degree of discretion, if any,left to the officer in the field;
2. The location designated for the roadblock;
3. The time and duration of the roadblock
4. Standards set by superior officers;
5. Advance notice to the public at large;
6. Advance warning to the individual approaching motorist;
7. Maintenance of safety conditions;
8. Degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation;
9. Average length of time each motorist is detained;
10. Physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation;
11. The availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem;
12. The degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and
13. Any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test.
The disputed roadblock, established pursuant to Sgt. Dave Lamph's guidelines,
complied with all but one of the above requirements, that of providing advance notice to the
public through the media. However, noncompliance with only one of the criterion does not
thwart the constitutionality of a roadblock. The court in Deskins, supra, stated: "Not all of
the factors need to be favorable to the state but all which are applicable to a given roadblock
should be considered." Id. at 1185. Given the state's enormous concern for protecting its
citizens from drunken drivers and the slight inconvenience it may pose to highway
travelers, this court should uphold the use of roadblocks in detecting and deterring those
driving under the influence.
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IL THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED REMOVAL FOR CAUSE
THOSE JURORS WHO REMAINED COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL
THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Defendant/appellant appeals the lower court's discretion in its refusal to remove for
cause (1) venireman Gottfredson for his moral beliefs concerning alcoholic consumption,
(2) venireman Ms. Searle for her previous work relationship with the prosecutor in the case
and (3) venireman Shaffer for her familiarity with another venireman. None of the
challenges are appropriate removals for cause. Furthermore, the presence of those
individuals in no way hindered defendant/appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial before
a jury.
Defendant/appellant cites as authority U.C.A. § 77-35-18(e)( 14) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but fails to cite the provision in its entirety. Read in its proper context,
a challenge based only upon an opinion formed by a potential juror regarding the crime
precludes any action for removal for cause. The latter-and most applicable-part of the
section reads,
. . . but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to
such jury,... if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and
will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to him.
The lower court did not question venireman Gottfredson's ability to "act impartially and
fairly," according to the above-cite section of the Utah Code. Given the court's appropriate
discretion in the matter, Gottfredson should not have been removed for cause simply
because of his moral belief concerning the consumption of alcohol.
Trial courts are granted great discretion in determining the impartiality of potential
jurors. Only if there is an grave abuse of that discretion will a court on appeal conclude that
there was a reversible error. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States. 451 U.S. 182 (1981),
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of jury selection on appeal:
[T]he adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to review. The trial
judge's function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later
on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and
credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of
11

responses to questions. [Citations omitted]. In neither instance can an
appellate court easily second-guess the conclusions of the decision maker
who heard and observed the witnesses. Id. at 188.
The Court further upheld the importance of a lower court's role in the jury selection
process. "Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with
the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions,... judges
have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire."
451 U.S. at 189. There is absolutely no indication of an abuse of discretion by the lower
court in its refusal to remove for cause those individuals who posed no threat to
defendant/appellant's constitutional rights.
Defendant/appellant's charge that venireman Gottfredson should have been removed
solely because of his religious beliefs concerning alcohol is overwhelmingly contradicted
by case law. Courts have routinely denied removal for cause those veniremen whose
dispositions toward a particular offense are unquestioned. In United States v. Elliott. 849
F.2d 554, (11th Cir. 1988), the defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related charges.
The court held that "a bias or prejudice towards a particular crime does not necessarily lead
to potential actual prejudice against an accused." (Citation omitted). Id. at 561.
Another case, United States v. Jones. 865 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1989) considered a
defendant's charge that the lower court had erred in refusing to strike a venire panel
member for cause. There, during the voir dire examination, one panel member openly
expressed her strong opinion about drugs and even expressed her uncertainty whether it
might "color or influence" the way she heard he evidence. The court held that the
defendant was not entitled to have her struck for cause, despite her inclinations frankly
stated.
Undoubtedly, in a trial of any charge-be it drugs, child abuse, robbery, or even
murder-there are going to be citizens morally opposed to the nature of the crime. Drinking
and driving is no exception. But as another court has recently held in denying such
removal for cause, the law does "not expect jurors to be free from all prejudices, however;
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rather, the law requires them to be able to put aside their prejudices and determine guilt or
innocence on the facts presented." Com, v. Smith, 540 A.2d 246, 256 (Pa. 1988). Given
venireman Gottfredson's ability to impartially hear the facts in the instant case and render
his judgment independent of whatever religious beliefs he may possess, the lower court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove him for cause.
Defendant/appellant additionally questions the working relationship between the
prosecuting attorney (Sherry Ragan) and one juror (Ms. Searle), as they taught some years
earlier at the same elementary school. However, courts have uniformly rejected challenges
for cause based upon acquaintances between jurors and counsel, unless the association was
one of a "close relationship." In Com, v. Johnson, 445 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 1982), the
court held that a prospective juror should be excused when that person "has such a close
relationship, be it familial, financial, or situational, with any of the parties, counsel, victims
or witnesses." Id. at 511. [Emphasis added]. Another court in Ward v. Com, 695
S.W.2d 404, (Ky. 1985) concurred, holding that legitimate grounds for removal exist if
parties maintain close personal ties: "Once that close relationship is established, without
regard to protestations for lack of bias, the court should sustain a challenge for cause and
excuse the juror." Id. at 407.
In the present case, counsel for the state and one juror were schoolteachers ten years
prior to the trial. When the court asked her to characterize thatfriendshipand asked if the
two "were real close," venireman Ms. Searle answered, "No." Instead, she characterized
her relationship with counsel as merely that of "just know[ing] her as another teacher."
Furthermore, the court specifically asked Ms. Searle if she "would have any tendency to
favor the State in this matter because who's the prosecutor, as opposed to the defense," to
which she again answered "No." Finally, and most importantly, the court asked Ms.
Searle if she thought she "could be totally fair and impartial," to which she responded
"Yes." (See Exhibit "C").
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In State v. Benge. 110 Ariz. 473, 520 P.2d 843 (1974), the court denied defendant's
challenge to lower court's refusal to remove one prospective juror on the basis of that
person's brief acquaintance with the prosecuting attorney. The court acknowledged that
jurors will invariably be familiar with attorneys on either side in any given case.
"However, that alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the appellants were prejudiced by
the acquaintance." Id. at 849. Whereas a potential juror may justifiably be removed if
there exists a "close relationship" between that person and counsel, a "casual acquaintance"
does not warrant removal. State v. Love, 43 So.2d 448 (La.App. 2nd. Cir 1983).
Countless other cases have held likewise, that mere familiarity with counsel—be it a distant
relative, neighbor, or business associate—is not enough to sustain a removal for cause.
(See, e.g., United States v. Thomas. 676 F.2d 239 (C.A.Ind. 1980), certiorari denied
Roberts v. United States. 449 U.S. 1091 (juror who was neighbor of government attorney
was not prejudiced); Poole v. State. 432 So.2d 514 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983) (fact that
venireman was second cousin to deputy district attorney was no ground for challenge for
cause); Howard v. State. 420 So.2d 828 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982) (juror related to counsel in
criminal case no grounds for removal); State v. Elmore. 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781
(S.C. 1983) (mere fact that any prospective juror is a friend or even a relative of counsel
does not automatically disqualify the prospective juror)).
Finally, defendant/appellant argues that venireman Ms. Shaffer should have been
removed given her familiarity with venireman Ms. Vance and her conduct in turning to Ms.
Vance and asking her a question. This contention must fail, given the complete lack of any
evidence suggesting possible bias shared by the two jurors which would impede their
ability to fairly and impartially hear the case. In Nichols v. State. 418 P.2d 77 (Okl.Cr.
1966) a prospective juror was confused by one specific question, but clearly showed by his
other answers that he was not biased or prejudiced and that he would try the case on the
evidence and testimony presented. The court ruled that there had been no abuse of
discretion when it overruled the defendant's challenge for cause.
14

CONCLUSION
The lower court properly upheld as constitutional the use of DUI roadblocks to
combat the enormous problem of drunk drivers on our highways when such checkpoints
are properly administered and are not an abuse of police discretion. Given the startling
national statistics of needless deaths attributable to those driving under the influence, DUI
roadblocks effectively serve the public's legitimate state interest in sparing further carnage
upon our country's highways. Moreover, when established pursuant to specific guidelines
that are most conscientious of a citizen's constitutional protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures, DUI roadblocks pose little intrusion upon those passing through an
area where such protective measures are being enforced.
The lower court properly refused defendant/appellant's challenges to remove for
cause those prospective jurors who posed no threat of prejudice or bias toward the accused
or the prosecuting attorney. All potential jurors will inevitably possess various beliefs or
moral dispositions towards the nature of any crime. Individual attitudes, however, will not
necessarily cloud a venireman's independent ability to fairly and impartially consider the
facts in a certain case based upon the particular evidence and testimony presented. Absent a
manifest and overtly expressed prejudice, a juror cannot be dismissed for cause merely
because of individual predilections.
Nor can a juror be removed based solely upon that person's familiarity with affected
parties or counsel unless a "close relationship" exists. A working relationship between two
school teachers existing over a decade before trial hardly qualifies as anything but a casual
acquaintance, far less than what comprises a "close relationship." Furthermore, no
grounds for removal exist merely because a juror inquires of another juror with whom she
is associated, absent any demonstration of possible bias or prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that the judgment of the lower court
be affirmed.
15

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^1 *?r

day of August, 1989.

Sherry Kagan /y
Deputy Utah Coiinty Attorney
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed to
Mitch Zager, attorney for DefendantAppellant, 3167 West 4700 South, West Valley City, Utah, 84118,
by placing said copy in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this
;?Y^r
day of August, 1989.

ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR IN THE

VS.

ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS

JOSEPH A. N0V0SEL,

Case, No, 881000303

Defendant.

The Court has received and duly considered Defendant's motion to suppress
or in the alternative to dismiss, including a statement of facts smd memorandum
of points and authorities; the Court has also considered the response of the
State of Utah; smd having heard testimony and oraJ. argument and being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
RULING AND ORDER

There is little dispute regarding the facts with respect to the
establishment and operation of the roadblock

and the stopping of the

defendant.
The roadblock was established by the Utah County Sheriff's Office
following complaints by residents in the Saratoga area south of Lehi
following am event called the sand drags. At the time, the Utah County
Sheriff had in effect a written policy for operation of roadblocks.
The Court finds that the roadblock in question complied with ten of
the eleven factors set forth for consideration by the Court in State v.
Despim, 6j3 P- 2d 1171* (Kansas 1983).

-1-

The only factor absent was advance

notice to the general public through media'publicity.

In this case the

officers were supervised; all vehicles were detained until all officers
were involved with a vehicle; the length of the stop and degree of
intrusiveness was limited; safety procedures were in place and followed.
The Court must balance the right of the operators and other occupants
of vehicles to be free from unreasonable search and seizure against the
interest of the State in ensuring that our public streets are safg.
The Court recognizes the legitimate interest of the State in detecting
unlicensed drivers and drivers operating vehicles while under the influence
of alcohol.

The Court also weighs heavily the rights of the individual

and the police state atmosphere that can be created by Court condoned stop
and seizure of citizens without reasonable suspicion.
The Court finds that the operation of the roadblock in this case and
subsequent arrest of the defendant was not an unreasonable stop and seizure
of the defendant.

The

Motion To Suppress Or In The Alternative To Dismiss

is hereby ordered, denied.
The Clerk of Court is directed to set this matter for trial.
DATED this 6th day of July, 1988.

JohnAI
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Backlun&i Circuit

Court Judge

\J

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Ruling and Order to
Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 37 East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah,
0U601 and to Mitchel Zager, 3167 West VfQO South, Salt Lake City, Utah 8U118, this
/ I <M^cLay of July, 1988.

yCl'erk of Court

"

^

Utah County Sheriff
^~7

1775 SOUTH DAKOTA LANE

PROVO, UTAH 84601

PHONE 374-2211

MACK HOLLEY
Sheriff

TO: Patrol Sergeants
FROM: Lt. David Lamph

DATE: October 11, 1984
RE: Roadblocks

Until such time as I am able to develop a more comprehensive
policy in this matter the following will be used.
1. The roadblock must be for a specific purpose, ie. drivers
license/ registration alcohol violations/ etc.
2.

The need for the roadblock/ if other than license and registration violations/ should be borne out through the use of
complaint reports/ extra patrol'requests/ or the deputy:s
personal knowledge.

3. The' sergeant on duty must be at the roadblock to supervisehis deputies actions.
C

4.

^

If the sergeant is not on duty his designated senior patrol
deputy must be at the roadblock.

5.

Deputies do not have the discretion to establish a nonemergency roadlbock.

6.

There will He no less than three deputies at any non-emergency
roadblock.

This number may include the sergeaiv: or senior

_

patrol deputy.

7.

Roadblocks will be held in a safe location/ eg. not a blind
curve.

^

Drivers of vehicles should be allowed a large amount

of reaction timp. and this should be in the deputies view*

2
8.

The public has a right to travel the highway in safety.
When the traffic has backed up to be a sufficient irritant
to the public or a safety hazard you will direct traffic
through stopping only the obvious violators.

9.

.

There will be an obvious escape route made at the roadblock in the event a violator "runs" the roadblock.

The

escape route will be in such a location that the deputy
is not in danger.
10. Roadblocks should be established where there is enough room
for the violator to pull off the roadway.
11. Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend those who
\\

evade the roadblock.
Patrol Commander
TITLE

m

STEVEN B. KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
37 East Center St., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-0136
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

REPLY TO SECOND
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL,

Case No.

1-7437-87

Defendant.

COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendants Second
Request For Discovery provides the following information:

1.

The exact time the roadblock was established and

dismantled are not matters of record with the Utah County
Sheriff's Office.
2.

The names of all officers attending the roadblock are

not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
Officers attending a roadblock may change as demands elsewhere
may require.

Total number of officers was never less than

requred by office policy.
3.

See Attachment #1.

No advanced advertisement or media notice was given of

this roadblock.
4.

The roadblock was located at the intersection of State

Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi,
Utah.

5.

See attachment #1.

6.

See attachment #1.

7.

The number of persons stopped at the roadblock is not a

matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
8.

The number of "DUI" arrests made at the roadblock is not

a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
9.

The number and nature of other arrests at the roadblock

are not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
10.

The number and nature of other citations issued at the

roadblock are not matters of record with the Utah County
Sheriff's Office.
11.

This question is repetitive of question #18.

See

question #18 answer.
12.

The average length of time each motorist at this

roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record with the Utah
County Sheriff's Office.

It is estimated that the average length

of time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah
County Sheriff's Office is between 30 seconds and one minute
unless a violation is detected.
13.

This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its

present form.
14.

The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph, Utah

County Sheriff's Office pursuant to attachment #1.
15.

The purpose of this roadblock was to check for Driver's

License, Registration and alcohol violations.
16.

Part one of this question related to Ma description of

the number of police vehicles" is ambiguous and cannot be

answered in its present form.

The location of police vehicles at

the time of the roadblock varied as vehicles arrived and
departed,
17.

All officers attending the roadblock were uniformed

officers.

The total number of officers at the roadblock varied

depending on various factors.

That part of this question related

to "their positions" is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its
present form.
18.

Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square

were placed on large highway cones in the middle of the roadway.
Signs read "Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead"
burning emergency flares.

and were placed with

Emergency lights on patrol vehicles

were left in operation.
DATED this 7th day of October, 1987.

KAY BRYSON {
_ -J_
Deputy Utah County Attorney

STEVEN B. KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
37 East Center St., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-0136
JN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL,

Case No.

1-7437-87

Defendant.

COMES NOW Deputy County Attorney, John Allan, on behalf of
the State of Utah, and hereby responds to Defendant's motion to
suppress

as follows:
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Prosecution admits to 'paragraphs 1-3 as being true.

2.

Paragraph 4 is correct in that there is no written

record of the time the roadblock was set up or dismantled.
However, the officers on duty do mentally recall the approximate
times of those activities.
3.

Paragraph 5 is incorrect in that the officers

conducting the roadblock were those officers on Sergeant Jim
Tracy's alcohol crew.
4.

Prosecution admits to paragraph 6 and 7.

5.

Paragraphs 8,9 and 10 are incorrect in that all

citations given at that roadblock could be counted and calculated

accordingly.

Therefore, there is a record of those arrests and

citations.
6.

Prosecution admits to paragraph 11.

7.

Paragraph 12 is incorrect in that each officer is

familiar with the restrictions out Lined by Sergeant Dave Lamph.
Said restrictions specifically outline safety precautions and the
purpose for each and every roadblock.
8.

In response to paragraph 13, the County Sheriff's

Office has been conducting roadblocks since late in the year of
1984.

Roadblocks became common procedure during the years of

1986 and 1987.

In L983 the County Sheriff's department issued

264 alcohol related citations and had 193 Driving Under the
Influence arrests.

In J984 alcohol citations were 828 and

Driving Under the Influence arrests rose to 293.

In the year

1985 alcohol citations increased to 987 and DUI arrests dropped
to 241 (less roadblocks were used that year because of severe
weather conditions).

In 1986 alcohol related citations more than

doubled to 2397 and DUI arrests increased to 432.

Through

October of 1987 there have been 2396 alcohol related citations
issued and 467 DUI arrests.

From these statistics it is evident

that roadblocks are more effective in detecting alcohol violators
than the standard roving patrol procedure.
9.
10.

Prosecution admits to paragraph 14.
Prosecution admits to paragraph 15; however, if the

defendant would prefer, a long form information wi LI be prepared
charging him with that offense also.

11.

In response to paragraph 16, the County Sheriff's

department did receive several oral complaints concerning the
alcohol problem in the area.

In fact, one of the complainants

deLivered a flyer stating the exact date, time, and location of
the sand drags in order that law enforcement might be increased
in the area.
II.
DUI ROADBLOCKS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Case of Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. ct. 1391 (1973), held
that at random stops without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion was an unconstitutional seizure under the fourth
amendment of the constitution.

The Court, however, went on to

say that the "Questioning of all on-coming traffic at roadblocktype stops is one possible alternative."

In fact, prior to

Prouse, a roadblock was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in State v. Martiney Fuerte, 96 S. ct. 3074 (1976).

In

that case the Court held that roadblocks near Mexican borders to
check for illegal aliens was constitutional.
The states of New Jersey, Kansas, Oregon, Indiana, Colorado
and California have all found roadblocks to be constitutional.
Most of these cases have cited Prouse v. Delaware as the
precedent for doing so.

The States of Massachusetts, Texas,

Arizona, and South Dakota have held roadblocks unconstitutional.
Many have researched and considered why there is a discrepancy
between the states.

The Court in State v. Deskins, 673 p. 2d

1174 (Kansas 1983), came out with a list of eleven points it felt
need be considered in order to assure a constitutional roadblock.
That list reads as follows:

1)

Advance notice to the public at large through media
publicity;

2)

Location selected and procedure developed by superior
officer;

3)

Degree of discretion left to the officer in the field;

4)

Method of warning to individual motorists approaching
the roadblock;

5)

Reason for the location designated for the roadblock;

6)

Time and duration of the roadblock;

7)

Maintenance of safety conditions;

8)

Average length of time each motorist is detained;

9)

Physical factors surrounding the location, type, and
method of operation;

10)

Degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of
operation; and

11)

Any other relevant circumstances which might bear on the
test.

Considering the roadblock in question and the guideline set out
by Sergeant Dave Lamph it is apparent that this roadblock met ten
of the eleven recommendations, only failing recommendation number
1 in that advance notice to the public through the media was not
supplied.

However, overlooking a single recommendation does not

destroy the constitutionality of the roadblock.

Again in the

Deskins case supra, the court stated:
Not all of the factors need to be favorable
to the state but all which are applicable
to a given roadblock should be considered.
Id at 1185.

III.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the officers conducting the roadblock did
adequately comply with the standards as set out in State v.
Deskins.

These and similar standards have become the basis for

determining whether a roadblock is constitutional or not.
Because the roadblock in question was created and handled with
the above recommendations in mind, it should be upheld as
constitutional.

On that basis, defendant's motion to suppress,

or in the alternative dismiss, all evidence obtained from said
roadblock should be denied.
DATED this 30th day of November, 1987.

JOHN L. ALLAN
Deputy Utah County Attorney

EXHIBITS

POLICY

The Sheriff's Department, to make the most economical
use of its deputies and equipment, will establish
checkpoints at various locations in Utah County. These
checkpoints will be used, primarily, to enforce Utah
State vehicle
registration, drivers
license, and
inspection requirements.

PROCEDURE

The following
procedure will be
implemented
and
followed to protect the Constitutional rights of those
stopped in the checkpoint.

1. Only

the Sheriff, Bureau Commander,
Commander may initiate a checkpoint.
a.

Field
deputies do not
establish checkpoints.

b.

The supervisor
will designate
scene.

have

or

Patrol

authority

to

who initiates the checkpoint
the deputy in charge at the

The deputy in charge at the scene will.
a.

Initiate a complaint report.

b.

Fill out UCSD OPForm 16 (Exhibit 1)
Ensure the checkpoint is set up and operated in
a safe manner.
1)

The following will be taken into account.
a)

Speed of the highway.

b)

Visibility.

c)

Weather conditions.

d)

Amount of traffic.

e)

Width of the road.
(1) There must be sufficient room
for a violator to be removed
from the roadway.

3

No less than three(3) deputies will be allowed to
operate a checkpoint.

4

Advance notice to the public will be made in
the following manner.

a.

The Patrol Commander, or his dejiqnee, will
place one advertisement in a local paper,
having general circulation, a month stating:
NOTICE
During the month of
the Utah
County
Sheriff's
Department
will
be
establishing
checkpoints
throughout
Utah
County.
These checkpoint will be used to
determine the validity of drivers licenses,
registrations and safety inspections.

b.

Signs will be placed prior to the checkpoint by
the deputy in charge.
1)

The signs will state
checkpoint ahead", or
roadblock ahead".

"Caution
"Caution

Sheriff's
Sheriff's

2)

The signs will be lighted by a flare during
the hours of darkness and be placed so as
to give advanced warning.

The deputy in charge will ensure that an escape
route is made at the checkpoint in the event a
driver "runs" the checkpoint.
The escape route
will be in such a location that the public and
deputies are not in danger.
Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend
those who attempt to evade the checkpoint.
The public will be detained no longer that is
necessary to check for violations of the State
Code.
a.

If traffic is backed up tc where the
detention will be longer than ten minutes
the traffic will be passed through the
checkpoint with only the obviois violations
stopped.
1)

Flares

This will continue until the detention
will be of short duration.

(depending on light conditions) and Cones
will be used to delineate traffic
lanes.

ROADBLOCK EVALUATION

)ATE

START TIME

END TIME

CRtt

—

DEPUTY IN CHARGE
PURPOSE OF ROADBLOCK
LOCATION
LEATHER & ROAD COND.
DIRECTION OF TRAFFIC
MUMBER OF DEPUTIES
MUMBER OF SIGNS

NAMES
—

WARNING SIGN LOCATION ( MUMBER OF YARDS FROM POR)
APPROX. NUMBER OF STOPS
NUMBER OF ARRESTS
DUI
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
State of Utah
V.

Case No. 87CR400

Frank Reynolds Stokes
Defendants Motion to Exclude Evidence and to Dismiss was
heard on December 10, 1987 with the Honorable Lynn W. Davis,
presiding. The State of Utah was represented by Sherry Ragan,
Deputy Utah County Attorney and defendant was represented by Steven
Lybbert, Esq. At issue is whether a warrantless temporary
roadblock, which is established to apprehend persons driving under
the influence of alcohol, and which stops automobiles without any
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, produces constitutionally
permissible arrests. Defendant's motion was made on the ground that
all evidence obtained from the stop as the result of an
unconstitutional seizure violated the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Art. I Section 14 of the Constitution of
Utah. The State urged the Court to uphold the stop in this case
based on public interest
It is uncontested that the defendant in this case was
stopped at a roadblock set up by the Utah County Sheriff's Office on
state road 92 in American Fork Canyon at 11:25 p.m. on June 19,
1987. Defendant was observed seated in the driver's seat, driving.
The Court took the matter under advisement for the purpose
of further researching the applicable law. The Court, having heard
oral arguments and having reviewed the respective memoranda, and
being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows:
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals
has had the occasion to analyze the constitutionality of roadblocks
to detect drivers under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Nor has
either court addressed the issue of roadblocks conducted for
administrative purposes. 1 The United States Supreme Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of a non-permanent, "routine"
sobriety roadblock and thus has not conclusively balanced the
competing Fourth Amendment interests.
Several Utah State trial courts, both district and circuit,
have addressed sobriety roadblocks, resulting in a split of
authority. 2 While the depth of analysis and decisive factors in
these cases vary significantly, they do provide some guidance.
However, opinions which lack a detailed reference to the oeprational
facts, guidelines, standards and policies of the respective law
enforcement agencies offer limited concrete guidance. Only one of
the cases references
1

the Constitution of Utah; none address the issue of statutory
authorization for roadblocks; and all the decisions appear to
rely exclusively on general Fourth Admendment jurisprudence
arguments. These decisions parallel the vast majority of
courts which also conduct their analysis exclusively upon
Fourth Amendment terms.
I.

STATE STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS

The major question before the Court is whether,
irrespective of constitutional questions, Utah law enforcement
agencies are authorized by State law to establish checkpoints
where vehicles are stopped for sobriety investigation or
administrative purposes.
Sheriffs and their deputies are granted authority to
preserve the peace and make all lawful arrests. (3) But, there
is no expressed authority found in Utah law which would
sanction roadblock activities. In order to enforce "Driving
Under the Influence" (DUI) laws, law enforcement agencies must
rely upon general police powers to provide for public safety
and welfare. Some implication of a specific charge to enforce
DUI laws is found in the supplemental state excise tax on beer
to fund rehabilitation and police efforts to combat the
epidemic. 6
Since Utah has not considered a roadblock case, it has
never addressed the attendant issue of "explicit v. implicit"
authority, although other jurisdictions have done so. States
remain divided on the issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, in the
recent case of Nelson v. Lane County, observed,
Roadblocks are seizures of the person or the person's
effects. For this reason, the authority to conduct
roadblocks cannot be implied. Before they search or
seize, executive agences must have explicit authority
from outside the executive branch. (emphasis added)7
This case was a civil action, brought for declaratory
judgment. The court noted that the authority relied upon by
the state police was not sufficiently specific, leaving open
the possibility that a direct statute would cure the authority
deficiency. In reliance upon that opinion the Oregon Supreme
Court also decided two other roadblock cases on the same day.
In both cases, evidence obtained at the roadblock was ordered
suppressed.8 In another civil case, brought for injunctive
relief, the California Supreme Court denied a writ of mandate
which was sought to prevent the California Highway Patrol from
operating roadblocks. The court termed the roadblocks as part
of a regulatory scheme, authorized by state law. 9
An Oklahoma court, in State v. Smith, was not persuaded
with the state's theory that would sanction roadblock stops on
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the basis of its police power to provide for public safety and
welfare. The court found ". . . n o statutory authority which
would support, directly or indirectly, the state's contention
that it has the power to establish checkpoints to inspect all
motorists to discern if any are intoxicated."10
On the other hand, persuasive argument can be made for
implicit authority. An appellate court of Illinois stated that
"criminal statutes do contain an implied right of the police to
enforce them. While there are state and federal constitutional
limitations on the means of enforcement, these limits are
constitutional and not inherent in every criminal statute ....
(A)bsent evidence of some contrary intent, the police should be
able to enforce those laws in a constitutional manner."
(emphasis added) 11
Even though the Oregon Court in Nelson reached a
contrary result, it summarized the "implicit authority"
argument in the following language:
Much criminal and regulatory law enforcement activity
takes place pursuant to authority implied from a broad
statutory directive. A broad directive to enforce
criminal laws, . . . together with the specification
of crimes developed by lawmakers, implies authority to
undertake tasks necessary to carry out the delegated
function. By and large, agencies of the executive
branch are free to carry out their assigned
responsibilities in ways of their own choosing. Making
explicit the manner in which an agency is to accomplish
its task falls to the agency head or that official's
designee to instruct or sub-delegate to subordinate
officials. 12
This Court finds implicit authority to conduct the
roadblock activity. Finding such authority, however, our
inquiry is not complete. We must further examine any extant
statutory limitations. Consider the language of the following
excerpts from the Utah Code:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
The authority of municipal police officers to effect an
arrest is likewise statutorily limited. 13
The members of the police force shall have the power
and authority, without process, to arrest and take into
custody any person who shall commit or threaten or
attempt to commit in the presence of the officer, or
within his view, any breach of the peace, or any
offense directly prohibited by the laws of this state
or by its ordinance. 14
3

The foregoing statutory restraints may arguably be more
stringent than Fourth Amendment restraints. While Utah law
requires "reasonable suspicion11 as a necessary prerequisite to
making a stop, the Fourth Amendment does not always so
require. While the United States Supreme Court has required
"some quantum of individual suspicion" as a general
prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure, it has
ruled that the Fourth Amendment imposes no "irreducible
requirement" of such suspicion. The Court has carved out a few
established and well-delineated exceptions dealing with airport
security, zoning violation enforcement, border control
activity, frisk searches and warrantless administrative
searches of commercial property. 15
The U.S. Supreme Court has not begun the analytical
process with the assumption that officers are entitled to
conduct any search or seizure not specifically proscribed by
the Fourth Amendment. In the case of Colonnade Corp, v. United
States, the Court ordered suppression of evidence seized by an
unconsented search because the officers lacked statutory
authority, even though their actions would not have violated
the Fourth Amendment. 16 The court in Nelson v. Lane County,
stated that it ". . . had often stressed the need to examine
statutory authority and the limitations imposed by the
authority before reaching any constitutional question." 17
This court will allow a stop at a sobriety roadblock without
individualized suspicion as being distinctive from the
statutory imperative requiring individualized- suspicion for a
singular vehicle stop. Satisfaction of this requirement alone
is insufficient. This Court must also consider further state
constitutional concerns..
II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
The right of the people to secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
It is notable that the language of the Constitution of
Utah, Art I, Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In many cases, state constitutions may provide greater
limitation on the powers designated to the government than do
the parallel provisions in the Constitution of the United
States. The state courts have the latitude to look to their
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respective consitutions. 18 "Structural differences in the
state and federal constitutions and matters of particular state
interest or local concern are two factors to be considered in
developing an independent body of state constitutional law." 19
The court in Kirk found that the subject roadblock was
unconstitutional since it rested too heavily on the discretion
of the field officers. The well-reasoned opinion was "rendered
on state constitutional grounds, exclusively, not on federal
constitutional grounds." 20 Another recent roadblock decision
relied solely on state constitutional grounds to find a
roadblock unconstitutional. 21
The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the wisdom of a
separate body of state constitutional law. Writing in Michigan
v. Long. Justice O'Connor noted that "it is fundamental that
state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting
their state constitutions." 22 In State v. Hunt, Justice
Handler wrote that a state constitution" . . . . is a more
appropriate vehicle to resolve questions concerning the rights
of its citizens to travel the highways of our state without
police interdiction and the rights of the police to use
reasonable methods to enforce our traffic laws than is the
federal constitution." 23 The landmark case of Delaware v.
Prouse, often cited in support of roadblocks, acknowledged that
highway safety and law enforcement is primarily a local
concern. 24
Nearly every court which has addressed the
constitutionality of roadblocks stop has adopted a balancing
test involving factors of public interest and individual right
to personal security, free from arbitrary interference by law
enforcement officers. Thus, the permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion
of-the citizen's Article I Section 14 interests against its
promotion of legitimate interests of the state. One can make a
compelling argument that the state constitutional analysis is a
"more appropriate vehicle" to resolve the competing state and
personal interests. Regardless, the prominent balancing test
advanced in Brown v. Texas is equally applicable to a state or
federal constitutional analysis. While the majority of the
arguments rely upon Fourth Amendment cases and concerns, most
are applicable to a state constitutional consideration; the
competing interests are the same. 25
Justice Michael D. Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court
has observed that "the whole question of the protections that
are affordable by and the remedies available under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, (Utah's) own search and
seizure provision has never been carefully considered by (the
Utah Supreme) Court." State v. Hyge, 711 p.2d 264, 271-74
(Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Mendoza, 71
Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
We believe that it is fair to say that the Utah Supreme
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traditionally followed the federal lead on search and seizure
cases; it has not departed dramatically from the growing body
of federal law in its analysis.
While Utah has developed no independent or separate
body of state constitutional law, both Justices Durham and
Zimmerman have expressed a willingness to seriously consider an
analytical approach premised upon article I, section 14
arguments. State v. Earl. 716 p. 2d 803, State v. Bishop. 717
p. 2d, 272, (Concurring, Durham J. Const. Art 5 & 1 grounds),
State v. Mendoza, 7 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29, (concurring
opinion), State v. Mastbaum, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, (dissenting
opinion), State v. Hvah, 711 p. 2d 264, 271-74, (concurring
opinion), American Fork City v. Crosarove, 701 p. 2d 1069
(Utah 1985); (State Constitution's self-incrimination
provision, Construction, Art. 1, Section 12 is relied upon in
Justice Durham's majority opinion). (Justice Zimmerman, in his
concurring opinion suggested an Article I, Section 14
analysis). Justice Zimmerman stated in Hvae, p. 273, that "the
federal law as it currently exists is certainly not the only
permissible interpretation of the search and seizure
protections contained in the Utah Constitution." There is
reason to believe that such an analysis may extend the scope of
individual protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures beyond that accorded by the Fourth Amendment.
In State v. Earl, 716 p. 2d 803, 805,806 (Utah 1986),
Justice Durham, in her majority opinion, noted that neither the
State nor defendant had discussed or relied independently on
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. She further
noted that despite the Court's willingness to independently
interpret the Utah Constitution in other areas of the law, "the
analysis of state constitutional issues in criminal appeals
continues to be ignored.11 J. Durham concludes with: "It is
imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state
constitutional questions.11 J. Zimmerman reemphasized that
position emphatically in Hygh, p. 272, stating, "sound
arguments may be made in favor of positions at variance with
the current federal law respecting both the scope of the
individual's right to be free from warrantless searches and
seizures and the remedy for any violation of that right."
Arguments may be advanced respecting constitutionality
under the Constitution of Utah, and Constitution of the United
States. Similar though they may be one cannot make the error
of proceeding to one without examination of the other. The
Mississippi Supreme Court recently underscored that "a
procedure may be perfectly in accord with the United States
Constitution and yet run afoul of state constitutional or
statutory requirements." 27
This court finds that neither counsel has adequately
articulated arguments premised on state constitutional
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grounds. Since the issue has not been squarely briefed, this
court must turn to Fourth Amendment arguments.
III.
A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES

Roadblocks are Seizures Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and Thus Must Be Applied to Fourth,
Amendment Criteria.

It is well-established that roadblocks and checkpoints
are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 28
Thus, after all other concerns have been addressed, the
roadblock must meet the requirements for a lawful search and
seizure. The traditional test demands both that a warrant be
obtained and that there be probable cause. 29 The Supreme
Court continues to stress that legitimate excusal of the
warrant requirement does not affect the probable cause
requirement. 30 There are few established exceptions to the
probable cause requirement. .. Among these are "Terry-type" stop
and frisk detentions, border searches, administrative
inspections, inspections of heavily regulated enterprises,
airport security checks, and inspection of ocean-going vessels
in U.S. waters. 31
It is probable that roadblocks pass muster under the
Carroll doctrine as a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. The Carroll Court established that an officer can
conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if "it is not
practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved." 32 The Court looked forward to potential abuse
of the newly-formed doctrine and cautioned:
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
(government) agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor ... (T)hose
lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public
highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent official authorized to search probable cause
for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise. 33
It is critical to recall that the Fourth Amendment protects
"people, not places." 34 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the restraint required in exercising the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, the Court stated, "The Carroll doctrine does not
declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles.
Automobile or no automobile there must be probable cause for
the search.." 35
B. Sobriety Roadblocks are Subject to a Balancing
of Interest Analysis in Determining Constitutionality.
Sobriety roadblocks are not based upon probable cause.
The Court must then examine the acceptable deviations from the

probable cause requirement. Obviously, a roadblock is not
similar to established probable cause exceptions such as
heavily regulated enterprises, permanent border crossings,
boarding of ship on the seas, or health and safety code
enforcement. While some tenuous arguments might be made by
analogy, this court finds that roadblocks do not fit the
criteria and formulae establishing these particular probable
cause exceptions. It is the opinion of this Court, rather,
that roadblocks must be viewed under a balancing of interests
analysis. In automobile search cases over the last few decades
the Supreme Court has adopted the interest balancing approach,
which is much less rigorous than traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis. 36
However, the Court has not stated that it would
employ a balancing test in all types of automobile searches.
In Brown v. Texas, a seminal case advancing the balancing
analysis in automobile searches, the Court said it would apply
the balancing test to "seizures that are less intrusive than a
traditional arrest.11 37
The Brown Court outlined the three stage balancing
analysis as follows: The first step considers the gravity of
public concerns served by the seizure as demonstrated by
specific, objective facts. Second, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest must be considered.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the severity of the
intrusion on individual liberty will be weighed. 38 If
sobriety roadblocks are to stand under the Fourth Amendment, it
must be shown that they effectively advance a significant
public concern, and that the instrusiveness is reasonable.
C.

The Public Interest in Detecting Intoxicated Drivers
is of Sufficient Magnitude to Warrant Extraordinary
Enforcement Approaches.

Without hesitation, any court may take judicial notice
of the national concern with the drunk driver. Various figures
are touted in the pages of newspapers and on the evening news
to illustrate the epidemic gravity of the problem. Best
estimates place the number of persons killed in alcohol-related
trffic accidents at 25,000 annually. 39 Well over an
additional half million are injured. 40 Property damage is
estimated to exceed five billion dollars annually. 41 Congress
has acted to deprive federal highway funds to those states not
enacting strict DUI enforcement provisions. 42 The Supreme
Court has cited the plight of drunk driving in South Dakota v.
Neville, stating "the situation underlying this case -— that of
the drunken driver—occurs with tragic frequency on our
highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is
well-documented and needs no detailed recitation here." 43
Justice Blackmun, writing in Perez v. Campbell, noted that the
"slaughter on the highways exceeds the death toll of all our
wars." 44 Several state courts have unequivocally held the
state interest to be compelling and overwhelmingly infavor of
the state. 45
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Nor has the issue escaped public outcry and protest.
Numerous groups with catchy, aggressive acronyms have sprung
into being in the past decade. Moreover, membership is growing
at a rate generally unparalleled in civic interest groups. 46
Public awareness is at a new high. Pressure on law enforcement
administrators may well be a driving reason for increased use
of roadblocks. Nearly half the states use roadblocks to some
degree in combating drunk drivers. 47 Furthermore,
supplemental incentive funds are available to those states
which implement procedures recommended by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, which include the use of
sobriety roadblocks. 48
Data respecting traffic fatalities in Utah are compiled
by the Utah Highway Safety Division of the Utah Department of
Public Safety and are published in its annual report. In 1986,
for example, 104 of the 312 reported fatalities were
alcohol-related and in 1987, 82 of the 297 fatalities were
alcohol-related. (1986 Utah-Traffic Accident Summary; 1987 Utah
Traffice Accident Summary; Published and compiled by the
Division of Highway Safety of the Utah Department of Public
Safety.) It is well documented that Utah's proportionate
number of fatalities associated with drinking drivers is
considerably lower than the national average; nationally,
approximately 50 percent of all traffic fatalities occur in
alcohol-related accidents. Regardless of the statistical
comparison with other states, fatalities occur with tragic
frequency. The data support fact that Utah has a significant
problem with the drinking driver. These statistics make it
painfully obvious that the risk posed to innocent drivers and
pedestrians by those who drink and drive is substantial.
The gravity of concern in Utah is evidenced by the
extensive history of legislative reforms aimed at "toughening"
drunk driving statutes. Because of citizen demands, intense
lobbying efforts and public outrage, the legislature within the
last decade has significantly increased the amount of fines,
added a "victim restitution" provision, reduced the level of
presumption, provided for an assessment and educational series,
added an "implied consent" statute and provided for mandatory
encarceration.
Based upon the above, this Court is compelled to
recognize the gravity of the public concern and takes judicial
notice of the same.
D.

The Efficacy of Roadblocks in Detection,
Apprehension and Deterrence of the Drinking
Driver.

One author has classed roadblocks as "woefully
deficient" in solving the DUI problem. 49 On the other side,
in State v. Superior Court, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
the state had demonstrated a decrease in DUI accidents due to
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the use of Arizona Department of Public Safety roadblocks. A
decrease of approximately 3.5% (at Christmas season,
traditionally at time of increases) was characterized by the
court as significant. 50 In what is perhaps the most
exhaustive scholarly treatment of DUI roadblocks to date,
Professors James B. Jacobs and Nadine Strossen examine
extensive statistical evidence and conclude that the evidence
supporting the efficacy of sobriety checkpoints is, at best,
inconclusive. 51
The number of potential offenders deterred by
roadblocks is debatable. For example, one court concluded that
"common sense alone" was sufficient to conclude that roadblocks
are effective deterrent measures. 52 In Delaware, the
lieutenant governor has credited highway patrol sobriety
roadblocks with a 23% decrease in alcohol related fatalities.
53 On the other hand, in a recent Arizona case, the court
noted that of 5,763 vehicles stopped at the subject roadblock,
only 14 drivers were arrested for DUI (no data is available as
to the number of these that were eventually convicted.) 54
That shows a mere 1 out of every 412 vehicles. Such minimal
success can hardly be expected to deter offenders. A study by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
researchers concluded that after the study of multiple
roadblocks in two different programs, no deterrent effect was
demonstrated.
55 However, France and Sweden have used
roadblocks for over five years and found a significant
deterrent effect. 56 After reviewing such inconsistent data
it seems fair, at least at this point, to agree with Jacobs and
Strossen in characterizing empirical roadblock data as
"inconclusive" at best. 57 Plaintiff has offered no data,
except for generic statements of law enforcement officers,
showing local efficacy in apprehension, or at least
deterrence. The officers did testify that they thought they
were more effective than road patrol for the apprehension of
drunk drivers. Upon cross examination, officer Adamson
admitted that no data has been compiled except in
individualized cases. Mere inconclusive data should not alone
prevent the use of roadblocks. No court has even attempted to
construct a standard against which empirical data should be
measured. It is the opinion of this Court that courts should
not be transformed into centers of accountancy to supplant
their role in serving law and justice. The testimony of the
officers, based upon day to day pragmatics, while not
statistically conclusive is sufficient. Officer Adamson
testified that roadblocks had been "extremely effective in
curbing alcohol violations."
E.

The "Neutral Criteria" Examined:
Limited and Controlled Intrusion
Upon the Motoristfs Liberty in the
Administration of Roadblocks.
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This Court now turns to the third, and final, element
of the balancing analysis: the severity of intrusion upon the
motoristfs Fourth Amendment interest. Many courts have
proceeded directly to this facet of the analysis, disregarding
completely the first two steps, or taking judicial notice of
their fulfillment. In Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, the
Supreme Court weighed both objective and subjective intrusion
in considering the constitutionality of a permanent immigration
checkpoint. The element of objective intrusions include the
stop itself, the physical inspection, and the questioning of
the motorist. 58 Generally, the objective intrusion at a
roadblock will be minimal. Most roadblocks require only a few
minutes of the motorist's time. 59 Usually the officer speaks
momentarily to the driver and views the interior of the
vehicle, checking for alcohol containers and weapons. 60 Given
the momentary and direct nature of the roadblock, it is
unlikely that any roadblock would be invalidated on the sole
basis of objective intrusion.
Nearly every case assessing the constitutionality of a
roadblock addresses the "neutral criteria" aspect of the
roadblock operation, and bases the decision on the presence and
comprehensiveness of the operational formula. One court
bifurcated its consideration of the subjective intrusion into
the element of fright and surprise and the element of
individual officer discretion. 61 Both are considered
oft-cited opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Deskins. 62 There the Kansas court set forth thirteen
non-exclusive factors to consider in arriving at a neutral
criteria to reduce the subjective intrusion to an acceptable
minimum. These include:
the degree of discretion, if any, left to the
officer in the field,
the location designated for the roadblock,
the time and duration of the roadblock,
standards set by superior officer,
advance notice to the public at large,
advance warning to the individual motorist
approaching the roadblock,
maintenance of safety conditions,
degree of fear or anxiety generated by the operation
of the roadblock,
average length of time each motorist is detained,
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10) physical factors surrounding the location, type, and
method of operation,
11) the availability of a less intrusive means for
combating the problem,
12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure,
13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear
on the test. 63
The Deskins court did not require that each factor be
resolved in favor of the state. 64 Certain factors are
crucial, such as the degree of fear generated and the
effectiveness concern. These are among factors included in
other courts' construction of permissible operational formulae.
65 Each court has placed particular emhasis on the first
factor, requiring controls on the discretion left to the field
officer. Unbridled discretion certainly could lead to an
intolerable level of subjective intrusion. In State v. Kirk,
the court singled out the discretionary factor, observing that
11
...
participation of command or superivsory authority in
selecting the time and place based on reasonable evidence of
social utility is an essentail constitutional ingredient and
necessary to satsify the objection that the traveler not be
subject to the discretion of the official in the field." 66
While there may be greater focus on a specific set of
factors, no single factor is held to be determinative. As with
any balancing test, application to a particular set of facts
may prove difficult. 67 With no clear controlling authority
and a multitude of factors to consider, the only avenue is to
examine the facts and circumstances of each case. As
illustrated by the Supreme Court, "there is no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or
seizure) entails. " 68 The roadblock which addresses every
minutia of constitutional law may never come to pass. Someone
will always be prepared to Monday-morning quarterback, as the
Supreme Court noted "(a) creative judge engaged in post hoc
evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some
alternative means by which the objectives of the police might
have been accomplished..11 69
Applying the criteria of Deskins to this case, this
Court finds:
1) that very little discretion was left to the
arresting officer, Shaun Adamson;
2) the location designated for the roadblock, at the
mouth of American Fork Canyon, was determined by supervising
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personnel based upon the frequency of alcohol-related problems
or response calls;
3) the time and duration of the roadblock were
determined by supervisory personnel, not by on site officers;
4) that the office of the Utah County Sheriff had
adopted regulations respecting the operation of a roadblock;
5) that there was no testimony respecting advance
notice, except for extant on site signage at both ends of the
roadblock (Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead);
6) the roadblock was properly illuminated with alley
lights, flashes, roadway cones, etc, and careful attention was
given to highway safety;
7) the average length of time each motorist was
detained was minimal, 1-2 minutes;
8) there was further testimony that canyons pose
particular problems and that this location was determined based
upon accident surveys and arrest statistics.
CONCLUSION
It is vital to curb the lamentable and needless deaths
on Utah's highways attributable to the drunken driver. Without
question there are soundly reasoned and compelling
constitutional arguments, both state and federal, which can be
advanced on both sides of the "public interest versus
individual liberty" issue. But, on balance, given a properly
administered roadblock, this Court concludes that the gravity
of the well-documented public concern in Utah and degree to
which the roadblock procedure facilitates detection and
abatement of drunken drivers, outweighs the minimal level of
interference with individual liberties. It is critical to note
that this Court does not conclude that all extant roadblock
procedures now being utilized by law enforcement agencies in
the State of Utah can withstand state or federal constitutional
scrutiny.
This Court has suggested, as one facet of any rigorous
analytical approach, that the roadblock activity be analyzed
under Article I, Section 14 standards of the Constitution of
Utah. Whether such an analysis will carry the day remains to
be seen, but with the frequent reminders from members of the
Utah Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of our own
constitutional provisions, it cannot be ignored. Justice
Zimmerman is eagerly optimistic that an independent state
constitutional analysis will result in a simplication of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which, in his words is a "labyrinth of
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing
rationalizations and distinctions." Hygh, 271-272. While not
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everyone shares that enthusiasm, few would fault his contention
that state constitutional arguments should not be foreclosed
from consideration by (the Court's) unanalyzed acceptance of
the federal position, Hygh p. 273. The state constitutional
considerations are inadequately briefed.
Defendant has relied upon the leading California case
of Inaersoll v. Palmer. The Court found that the roadblocks
were administered as part of a regulatory scheme, authorized by
law. The administrative or regulatory argument has no current
applicability in the State of Utah in that Utah has no
comparable statutory scheme. A number of state legislatures
have enacted procedures authorizing roadblocks, People v.
Scott, 473 N.E. 2d, 6, footnote #4. To date, the Utah
Legislature has not chosen to do so.
Despite the multitude of obstacles to overcome in
constructing a constitutionally permissible roadblock, it is
fair to conclude that a sobriety roadblock is constitutional if
properly administered. The subject roadblock was properly
administered. This Court supports, without reservation, the
criteria advanced by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Deskins. 71
Because of the intricacies involved in balancing of
interests, roadblocks must be approached on a case-by-case
basis. Although a small number of courts have held sobriety
roadblocks to be per se unconstitutional, this Court does not
find their reasoning persuasive. A majority of the courts
finding a particular roadblock unconstitutional have suggested
or intimated ways in which the fatal defect could have been
cured. (see appendix I)
Based upon the above case, law defendant's Motion to
Exlcude is hereby denied. With that decision defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is also, hereby, denied.
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APPENDIX
A Summation of Selected Cases Relevant to Roadblock Issues.
Federal Cases:
Delaware u. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). This case might be termed the pseudoseminal case construing roadblocks. A lone patrolman, without assignment or
particular duty, decided to stop a motorist for a routine license and registration
check. No violation had been observed. The Court found the stop to be an
unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Roadblocks are mentioned only
in dicta as a possibly constitutional tool to enforce administrative concerns. The
Court did not consider the nature of the government interest that might be
advanced in a sobriety roadblock. While recognizing the need for neutral criteria,
the Court did not give any guidance in what that criteria might be. Nor did the
Court define how closely the sobriety or administrative roadblock must conform to
the constitutionally allowed border control roadblocks. Finally, the Court did not
address the degree to which one method of enforcement must be more effective
than less intrusive methods. This case presents an excellent history of the
balancing test as applied to automobile issues.
United States u. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Supreme Court upheld
permanently established border control roadblocks, and dismissed the necessity of
a warrant for the checkpoints. The Court reaches its conclusions through a
balancing of interests analysis.
United States u. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Two Border Patrolmen
operated a roving-stop operation, stopping the defendants because they appeared
to be of Mexican descent. The Court upheld such a stop, when based on
reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing. The Court stressed that in allowing stops to
be made with less than probable cause, the investigation must not depart from the
initial focus, absent the establishment of probable cause to do so.
Brown u. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The defendant was arrested for possession of
narcotics after being stopped on a routine traffic inspection. In this case, the
Court cohesively explains the factors that apply to a fourth amendment balancing
test.
Almeida-Sanchez u. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Court held that
roving patrols by border agents were not exempt from warrant and probable cause
requirements, when such patrols were conducted away from the border or its
functional equivalent.
United States u. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 981 (1975). The Fourth Amendment was held to
prohibit searches of private vehicles at traffic checkpoints removed from the
border or functional equivalent, absent consent or probable cause.
United States u. Pritchard, 645 F.2d 854, (10th Cir.), cert, denied* 454 U.S. 832
(1981). While this case is controlling in the local circuit, no substantive analysis
in undertaken, although the subject roadblock was upheld.

State Cases:

Commonwealth v. McCeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.£.2d 349 (1983). The
roadblock in question was held unconstitutional on the grounds of insufficient
warning devices, lighting and police presence. Officer discretion was also found
to be excessive. A formula for acceptable roadblocks was advanced.
Commonwealth u. Trumble, 396 Mass, 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985). The roadblock
was held constitutional when it followed a detailed directive promulgated by the
Secretary of Public Safety. The approved plan is contained in the case appendix.
Higbie u. State, 723 S.W.2d .802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). When a driver's license
checkpoint was a subterfuge for a sobriety roadblock, it was found
unconstitutional. The court strongly condemned the subterftige, and did not rule
out constitutionally permissible roadblocks.
Ingersoll u. Palmer, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299 (1987). In this civil action,
the California Supreme Court affirmed roadblocks when executed incompliance
with California statutes, and when the roadblock met the safety and operational
criteria in the state codes.
In re Richard T., 185 Cal. App. 3d 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1986). The court
suppressed evidence obtained at a sobriety roadblock on the grounds that no
warrant had been obtained to operate the roadblock.
Jones u. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. App. 1984). The court suppressed roadblock
evidence when the state failed to show proper planning and neutral criteria in the
operation of the roadblock. The court held that sobriety roadblocks could pass
constitutional tests, if executed according to acceptable criteria.
Little u. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984). Gravity of the DUI problem
and carefully crafted regulations were cited by the court in holding that the
sobriety roadblock was not violative of the Fourth Amendment, and no warrant
was required. Authority to conduct the roadblock was based on the common law
right of arrest.
Lowe u. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1985). The court sustained a
roadblock where the officers were required to stop every car and check for
driver's licenses and intoxication.
Nelson u. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987). The court invalidated
the use of roadblocks based on the absence of statutory authority, and held that
common law or general police power statutes were not sufficient.
People u. Bartley, 109 IU. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 380 (1985). The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the Illinois Appellate court which found roadblocks to be per se
unconstitutional. The court found that the state had a ,,compeiling,t interest in
detecting DUI drivers. The subjective and objective intrusions were of primary
concern to the court in exercising the balancing test.
People u. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1 (1984). The court held that a
roadblock would be permissible as long as neutral criteria were followed. The
court recognized the diminished expectation to privacy in a vehicle. Significant
reliance was given to the county sheriffs comprehensive written plan.
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be invalid when the roadblock was a subterfuge for other purposes and the state
police attempted to "piggy-back" statutory authority from the fish and game police
in conducting the roadblock.
People u. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864 (1982). In this roadblock
every vehicle in a particular area was followed and stopped for questioning about
burglaries in the area. While the court found this to be a significant intrusion,
the roadblock was upheld. The court stated that the roving roadblock seemed to
be the most effective method in combatting the burglary problem. The officers
had limited discretion and followed a uniform procedure.
State u. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986). A roadblock initiated by a
field sergeant and 4 officers was found to be excessively arbitrary, since the
officers operating the roadblock chose the time, place and method used.
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 539, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). This court supported a
roadblock analyzing the roadblock in terms of implied police power, state
constitutional grounds (the Kansas state constitutional provision is identical to
that of Utah), and the Fourth Amendment. The court advanced a set of criteria
(see notes).
State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983). The
court considered the amount of field officer discretion, lack of empirical support
for roadblock efficacy, and lack of established guidelines to find a roadblock
unconstitutional.
State u. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1986). The Indiana Supreme Court held
roadblocks to be constitutional when fixed, non-arbitrary procedures were
followed. The case overruled State u. McLaughlin^ 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. App.
1984).
State u. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984). A roadblock with
experienced and trained officers, when following a specific administrative order,
was upheld. The intrusion was slight and brief, with additional questioning based
upon probable cause developed in the initial interview.
State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (1985). The court held that any
constitutional objection to a roadblock could be overcome by following nonarbitrary criteria, formulated by administrative officers. The court focused on
limiting the discretion of field officers. The state constitution was followed in
reaching the court's decision, finding that to be a more appropriate vehicle than
the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W.2d 740 (1978). Even though an officer
may have specific suspicion which might not justify a stop, a stop at a roadblock
will be constitutional if the officer follows criteria in a non-arbitrary fashion.
When driver's license and registration checks are conducted in accordance with
state statute, they are proper.
State u. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980).
A roadblock was held
unconstitutional when conducted by 2 field officers without supervisory planning
or authorization, and no warning signals or illumination were used. The court
suggested criteria which would have cured the fatal defects isee notes).
A-3
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a roadblock operated by 2 troopers on their own initiative. A state policy had
been formulated, but the court found it to be inadequate, since it allowed
officers nearly unlimited discretion in operating roadblocks. The court stated
that the statutes and regulations were not sufficiently specific in addressing the
balancing of interests.
State u. Muziky 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. App. 1985). The court suppressed evidence
from a roadblock because the state did not meet the burden of showing that less
intrusive methods were not as effective and that there was little attempt to
lessen the fear and apprehension generated by the roadblock.
State u. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Cr. 1984). The court held sobriety roadblocks
to be per se unconstitutional. Little analysis is offered* in the opinion.
State u. TourtillotU 289 Or. 835,^618 P.2d 423 (1980). The state interest in
enforcing game laws was sufficient to justify the roadblock at which the
defendant was arrested* The roadblock was authorized statute and the discretion
was limited.
Webb u. Statey 695 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App. 1985). The court found a driver's
license checkpoint, operated on a street with bars, to be a subterfuge, when the
officers stopped motorists and failed to ask for driver's licenses. The court
condemned the practice of spurious driver's license checkpoints.
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58. Martinez-Fuerte u. United Slates, 423 U.S. 543, 553 (1976).
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1073, 1077 (1984) (five to twenty second stops); State, v. McGlaughlin, 471
N.E.2d 1125, 1138 (Ind. Ct App. 1984) (two to three minute stops;.
60. Little u. State, 300 Md. 485, 497 A.2d 903', 907 (1984);Sto*e v. McGlaughlin.
471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139 find. Ct. App. 1984). But cf., Peoole u. Bartley, 125
111. App. 3d 575, 466 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1984) (use of flashlight to inspect
interior of vehicle was one 9 of the elements making the roadblock a
"significant degree of intrusion.* )
61. State u. McGlaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1139 (1984).
62. See, e.g., State u. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 ilnd. Ct. App. L984); State v.
Kirk, 493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. 1985); see also. State u. Hilleshiem. 291
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63. State u. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 536, 673 P.2d 1174, 1135 (1983).
64.

637 P.2dat 1185.

65. See, e.g., State u. HUleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 313 (Iowa 1980), estabiishing a
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authority and police power of the community, 4) a pre-determination by
policy-making administrators of the roadblock time, location, and procedures
to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral
criteria; Little o. State, 300 Md. 485, 501, 479 A.2d 903, 911 (1984), offering
a similar four part formula: 1) careful circumscription of field officer's
discretion by clear objective regulations previously established by high level
administrative officials, 2) approaching motorists are given adequate warning
of the roadblock ahead, 3) the likelihood of fear, apprehension or surprise
is reduced by a display of legitimate police authority at the roadblock, and
4) vehicles are stopped on a systematic, non-random basis to show drivers
that they are aot being singled out for arbitrary reasons; Commonwealth u.
McCeoghegan et al., 389 Mass. 137,
, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983), in
deciding this case and fourteen companion cases, the court suggested the
following: 1) The inconvenience to the motorist be minimized, 2) the
selection procedure not be arbitrary, 3) Safety of motorists be assured, 4)
the roadblock must be systematic, not random, 5) there must be a prearranged plan established by supervisory staff; State v. Tourillot, 289 Or.
845, 864-65, 618 P.2d 423, 433 (1981), cert, den., 451 U.S. 972 (1981),
articulating their test as: 1) An important government interest is at stake, 2)
consideration of the physical and psychological intrusive nature ot the
roadblock procedure, 3) the efficiency of the roadblock in reaching the
desired goal, and 4) the degree of discretion vested in the tield officers.
State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 23, 493 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1985), quoting
Camara u. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
State u. Tourillot, 289 Or. 345, 364-65, 613 P.2d 423, 433 (1981), cert, den.,
451 U.S. 972 (1981).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
United States u. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985).
State u. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 23, 493 A.2d 1271, 1279 (1985).
State u. Deskins, supra, note 63.
Camara u. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
In re Richard T., 185 CaL App. 3d 732, 229 CaL Rptr. 384, 897 (1986)
(holding a warrant to be indispensable to the roadblock's validity).
Supra, notes 39-41, 43.
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